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Differential recall of central and peripheral details of
emotional slides is not a stable phenomenon
Ineke Wessel, Petra van der Kooy, and Harald Merckelbach
Maastricht University, The Netherlands
A number of studies have reported that central information of an emotional scene is well retained,
whereas peripheral details of such a scene are poorly recalled. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that
attentional narrowing is responsible for this phenomenon. Inaddition, an attempt was made to increase
the ecological validity of the experiment by giving extensive self-relevant instructions. Results showed
that, although an emotional slide elicited eye-movements consistent with attentional narrowing, the
correspondingrecall patternswereabsent. Experiments 2and3exploredsomeof thevariables thatmight
be responsible for the latter result. Experiment 2, relying onthe original designof ChristiansonandE.F.
Loftus (1991), found enhanced recall of central information of an emotional scene. Experiment 3
systematicallyvaried stimulus exposureand interstimulus interval durations. However, the results of this
experiment were rather complex and did not fully support the predicted differential recall patterns.
Possible explanations for these findings are discussed. It is suggested that othermethods (e.g. increasing
levels of emotion rather than involvement) may be more suitable for testing the attentional narrowing
hypothesis of emotional memory.
INTRODUCTION
In eyewitness literature, it is frequently claimed
that not all details of emotional situations are
remembered equally well. More specifically, it is
thought that memory for the gist (central details)
of an emotional event is relatively good, whereas
memory for irrelevant information (peripheral
details) is relatively poor (see, for overviews,
Christianson, 1992; Heuer &Reisberg, 1992). A
common explanation for these recall patterns is
inspired by Easterbrook’s (1959) cue-utilisation
hypothesis. For example, Christianson (1992)
suggests that emotional arousal promotes atten-
tional narrowing such that attention would be
directed to central details, at the expense of
attention for peripheral details. This attentional
focus, in turn, would result indifferential recall of
central and peripheral information. Thus,
accordingtotheattentional narrowinghypothesis,
two variables are important for emotional mem-
ory formation, namely physiological arousal and
attention.
As for the first variable, detail memory studies
consistently demonstrate that emotional scenes
producehigher self-report ratings of emotionality
(Christianson&E.F. Loftus, 1987, 1991;Heuer&
Reisberg, 1990) or larger physiological responses
(Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Heuer &
Reisberg, 1990) than do neutral scenes. In line
with the attentional narrowing hypothesis, these
studies found enhanced memory for central
details, whereas memory for peripheral details
was relatively poor (Burke et al., 1992; Chris-
tianson&E.F. Loftus, 1987, 1991; but seeHeuer
&Reisberg, 1990).
The second variable involves visual attention.
It is generally assumed that eye fixation patterns
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reflect visual attention (Christianson, Loftus,
Hoffman, & Loftus, 1991; G.R. Loftus, 1972;
Loftus,Loftus,&Messo, 1987). Studiesmeasuring
eye-movements suggest that compared to neutral
scenes, emotional scenes elicit longer fixation
durations (Loftus et al., 1987) or a higher fre-
quency of fixations (Christianson et al., 1991;
Loftus et al., 1987) on central features. In these
studies it was found, again, that central details of
emotional material are better retained (Chris-
tiansonetal., 1991),whereasperipheraldetailsare
more poorly retained (Loftus et al., 1987) com-
pared to neutral material.
Taken together, support for the attentional
narrowing hypothesis comes from two sources:
studies measuring memory for arousing stimuli
and studies examining visual attention andmem-
ory. However, so far, no study has concurrently
measured arousal, visual attention, and detail
memory. In addition, two issues relevant to the
attentional narrowing hypothesis warrant further
exploration.
The first issue concerns ecological validity. A
general criticismof laboratory studies onemotion
andmemory is that theyare toofar removedfrom
real lifeandthatgeneralisingexperimentaldatato
emotional life events (e.g. trauma) is not justified
(e.g. Terr, 1994; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1992).
Strictly speaking, this position implies that emo-
tional memory canonly be examined in field stu-
dies. However, this type of studymay suffer from
problems such as retrospective bias or circularity
due to post-hoc categorisation of central and
peripheral information (Christianson & E.F.
Loftus, 1990; Wessel & Merckelbach, 1994).
Because these problems can be circumvented in
controlled experiments, it seems worthwhile to
find approaches that increase the ecological
validity of laboratory studies on emotion and
memory. YuilleandTollestrup(1992) argued that
emotional intensity and involvement of the sub-
jects arecritical differencesbetweenexperimental
situations and real-life traumatic events.
Obviously, ethical considerations preclude indu-
cing intense emotion in college student samples.
Thus, increasing the involvement of normal sub-
jects intheexperimental situationisoneof thefew
options for researchers who attempt to increase
the ecological validity of their experiments.
A second issue pertains to the question of
whether attentional narrowing is restricted to
emotional events. It could be argued that
emotional events are not only emotional, but also
quite unusual in the course of daily life. There are
several reasons tobelieve that unusual stimuli are
remembered or attended to differently from
neutral stimuli. To begin with, studies of the so-
called isolationeffect showenhancedmemory for
outstanding stimuli in homogeneous context (see
Hunt, 1995). Second, literature closely related to
the topic of central andperipheral detail memory
provides some evidence that unusualness rather
than threat value underlies the phenomenon of
weapon focus (Pickel, 1998). Third, eye-move-
ment data indicate that people fixate longer and
more often on unusual objects compared to
objects that are to be expected given the context
(G.R. Loftus & Mackworth, 1978). In order to
control theoutstandingpropertiesof anemotional
stimulus, Christiansonandcolleagues includedan
unusual control condition in their experiments
(Christianson&E.F. Loftus, 1991;Christiansonet
al., 1991). On the whole, the results of these stu-
dies were rather complex. One study (Chris-
tianson et al., 1991) found that the unusual and
neutral conditions yielded rather similar eye-
movements and detail memory performance (i.e.
relatively poor memory for central details com-
pared to an emotional condition). In contrast,
ChristiansonandE.F. Loftus (1991) reported that
viewing the same unusual scene resulted in
impaired recall of both central and peripheral
items. Clearly, the influence of unusualness needs
further clarification.
In the first experiment reported in this paper,
an attempt was made to test the attentional nar-
rowing hypothesis by concurrently employing
measures of arousal, attention, and memory. As
thisexperimentfailedtofindtheanticipatedrecall
patterns, two further experiments were con-
ducted. These studies explored the circumstances
under which differential recall of central and
peripheral details occurs. In each experiment,
participants were college students who saweither
an emotional, unusual, or neutral situation. With
the issue of ecological validity in mind, Experi-
ments 1 and 3 sought to increase subjective
involvement by givingparticipants extensive, self-
relevant instructions.
EXPERIMENT 1
ThemainpurposeofExperiment 1was totest the
attentional narrowing hypothesis by concurrently
employing measures of arousal, visual attention,
and detail memory. More specifically, three
predictionswere tested. First, it wasexpectedthat
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an emotional image would elicit larger physiolo-
gical arousal responses (i.e. skin conductance)
than either an unusual or a neutral one. Second,
with respect to eye-movements, it was predicted
that the emotional scene would elicit longer fixa-
tions on the central itemand shorter fixations on
the peripheral itemcompared to the unusual and
neutral conditions. The third predictionwas that,
relative to theneutral andtheunusual conditions,
the emotional condition would produce better
memory for central information and impaired
memory for peripheral information.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 63 undergraduates at
Maastricht University. Their mean age was 20
years (range 18–27 years). Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions (Emo-
tional Condition, n=22; Unusual Condition,
n=21; Neutral Condition, n=20. They were paid
for their participation.
Stimulus material. The stimulus material
consisted of a thematic series of 15 slides.1 The
slide series was about a student who was on the
way to university to take an exam. The slides
depicted typical scenes that a student would
encounter in such a situation (e.g. a bedroom, a
kitchen, a street, etc.). Each slide contained two
critical items, one that was central and the other
peripheral. The slide series were equal for three
versions, with the exceptionof the eighth, critical
slide. Inthis critical slide, the central detail varied
across conditions. In the emotional version, a 9-
year-old girl was lying on a pedestrian crossing,
bleeding from a head injury. In the unusual ver-
sion, thesamegirlwasseenlyingonthepedestrian
crossing in a gymnastic position (i.e. holdingboth
legs in the air). In theneutral version, the girl was
walking on the pedestrian crossing. The position
of thegirl onthepedestriancrossingandtheangle
fromwhich the photographwas takenwere iden-
tical in eachversion.Apinkbicycle standingnear
the right margin of the slide served as peripheral
itemin each of the critical slides.
Apparatus. A Kodak carousel projected
slidesonawhitewall approximatelytwometres in
front of the subjects. The projected images were
125´85cm.
During slide presentation, Skin Conductance
Responses (SCRs) were recorded through two
Beckman Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the
second and third finger of the subject’s non-
dominant hand. Electrodermal recording sites
were cleansed with distilled water. Electrodes
wereconnectedtoaSchwartzerEDAcoupler. To
record SCRs, the method of constant voltage
(0.5V) was used.
Eye-movementsduring slidepresentationwere
registered using an Eyemark recorder (model V,
NACInc.). This recorder projects infra-red lights
on subjects’ corneas, which are transformed into
fixationspots. Fixationspotswere imposedonthe
slide image recorded by a video camera attached
to subjects’ foreheads. Subjects’ heads were fix-
ated during slide presentation in order to avoid
headmovements.
Procedure. Subjects were tested individually
in a sound-attenuated, dimly lit room. Upon
arrival in the laboratory, subjects were told that
the experiment involved recording of their phy-
siological reactions toaseriesofslides.Noexplicit
mention of amemory task was made. Next, SCR
electrodes were attached and the Eyemark
recorder was positioned and calibrated.
Following this, subjects receivedextensive self-
relevant instructions. They were instructed to
imagine that they were the main character in a
slide story. Theywere told that every scene in the
storywas photographed fromtheir perspective, as
if they were seeing it through their own eyes. In
addition, to aid imagination, subjects received a
tape-recorded instruction immediately before
presentation of the slides (seeAppendix).
Immediately after the tape-recorded instruc-
tion, the first slide (depicting a bedroom) was
presented. Slides were presented for 4 seconds,
and intervals between slides were 6.6 seconds.
After slide presentation, the SCR electrodes and
the Eyemark recorder were removed. Next,
subjects completed filler questionnaires for 10
minutes.
Subsequently, subjects were given threemem-
ory tasks. First, they completed aFree Recall task
1 This newly developed stimulus material was modelled
after that ofChristiansonandE.F. Loftus (1991). Ina separate
pilot study (n=33), characteristics of this material (e.g. emo-
tionality, credibility, etc.) were evaluated. The results of this
preliminarystudyconfirmedthat theemotional slidewas rated
as less pleasant andmore emotional than the unusual and the
neutral slides. In addition, the unusual slide matched the
emotional slide in terms of its outstanding (i.e. attention-
catching) properties. Further information on the slide series
and its properties are available on request.
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that asked for a brief description of all the slides
they had seen. Second, a Cued Recall task was
administered. Subjects were shown a series of 15
slides, similar tothefirst series, withtheexception
that the central and peripheral items were
removed. During presentation of each slide, sub-
jects wrote down which items they thought were
missing fromthat slide. Third, subjects completed
aDetailed Cued Recall task. For this purpose, the
critical eighth slide without the central girl and
peripheral bicycle was presented. This time, sub-
jectswereaskedtodescribethemissingitems inas
much detail as possible, with respect to colour,
shape, size, position, and so forth. For completion
of all recall tasks, subjects were allowed as much
time as they needed. Finally, theywere debriefed
and were asked not to discuss the purpose of the
study with other students.
Scoring of physiological data. SCRs were
measured in microsiemens and were defined as
the largest response with onset during slide pre-
sentation. SCRs to the critical slide were square
root transformed (ÖSCRs) in order to normalise
thedistribution.Duetoapparatus failure, SCRsof
one subject in the unusual conditionwere lost.
Eye-movementswere scoredas follows. First, a
digital clock was recorded on the videotapes,
which indicated time with an accuracy of 0.01
seconds. Then, the videotapes were played back
frame by frame. Three observers simultaneously
scored the amount of time subjects looked at the
central girl or the peripheral bicycle. In order to
doso, theobservershadtoagreeabout thetimeat
which the subjects’ eyes arrived at a particular
itemand the time at which the eyes shifted away
again. Fixations within a particular item (e.g.
shifting the eyes fromthe girl’s head to her feet)
were not scored separately, because interfixation
distances were too short to obtain accurate jud-
gements. Due to calibration problems with the
Eyemark recorder, the data of 12 subjects were
unreliable (emotional condition, n=3; unusual
condition, n=6; neutral condition, n=3).
Scoring of Memory Data. Following Chris-
tianson andE.F. Loftus (1991, experiment 1), we
adopted a strict criterion for evaluating fee and
cued recall. That is, central items were scored
correct if subjects explicitly mentioned ‘‘girl’’ or
indicated sex. For the peripheral items, the
response ‘‘bicycle’’ was scored correct.
The more specific data collected with the
Detailed Cued Recall test were scored in accor-
dance with the definition of Christianson (1992,
p.291) that central information is ‘‘information
that is connectedwiththe sourceof theemotional
arousal (i.e. the gist of the event and its central
details)’’, while peripheral information refers to
‘‘information that is irrelevant or spatially per-
ipheral to the source of the emotional arousal.’’
Thus, although certain details of the central girl
(e.g. colour of clothing, position on the crossing)
may be considered thematically irrelevant, they
were treated as central because they were asso-
ciatedwiththecentral girl. Forboththeemotional
andtheunusual slides, therewasamaximumof18
scorable characteristics of the central girl. For the
neutral slide, therewas amaximumof 15possible
details associated with the central girl. The max-
imumof scorable central elements differedacross
conditions because characteristics such as blood
(emotional slide) and smiling face (unusual slide)
were absent in theneutral slide. However, for the
emotional, unusual, andneutral slides, therewasa
maximumof 12 scorable elements of the periph-
eral bicycle. To correct for different base-rates,
subjects’ responsesonthedetailedcuedrecall test
were transformed into proportions of the max-
imum number of characteristics that could be
maintained for the itemof interest (i.e. 18, 15, or
12). In order to facilitate comparisons with the
original Christianson and E.F. Loftus (1991)
experiment, we also looked at the number of
subjects who spontaneously mentioned one
specific characteristic during detailed recall, viz.
the colour of the central girl’s shirt and/or the
colour of the peripheral bicycle.
Results
ÖSCRs. MeanÖSCRswere0.73 (SD=0.58),
0.38 (SD=0.36), and 0.23 (SD=0.27) in the
emotional, unusual and neutral conditions,
respectively. A one-way ANOVA showed a
significant difference between conditions,
F(2,59)=7.35, p<.01. Planned comparisons
revealed that the emotional slide elicited sig-
nificantly largerÖSCRsthaneither theunusualor
the neutral slide (ps<.05).
Eye movement data. Mean fixation times
were subjected to a 3 (conditions)´2 (central vs
peripheral detail) ANOVA with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor. This yielded significant
main effects for condition, F(2,48)=5.21, p<.01,
and detail, F(1,48)=42.02, p<.001. In addition,
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the critical interaction effect was significant,
F(2,48)=4.68, p<.05 (see Figure 1). To break
down this interaction, three separate 2 (condi-
tion)´2 (detail) repeated measured ANOVAs
wereconducted.Relativetotheneutral condition,
the emotional condition was characterised by
longer fixations on the central girl and shorter
fixations on the peripheral bicycle, as evidenced
by a significant interaction effect, F(1,34)=7.11,
p<.05. Contrary to expectations, mean fixation
time patterns in the emotional and unusual con-
ditions did not differ, F(1,32)=1.97, p=.17.
Moreover, the group by detail interaction for the
unusual and neutral groups was marginally sig-
nificant, F(1,30)=4.16, p=.05.
Recall. Results of the memory tests are pre-
sented in Table 1. For free recall, there was a
significant differencebetweenconditions in terms
of number of subjects reporting the central girl,
c2(2)=7.24, p<.05. Separatec2 tests showed that
compared to the neutral condition, significantly
more subjects in the unusual condition reported
thecentral girl,c2(1)=7.43, p<.01.Theemotional
conditiondidnot differ fromeither theunusual or
neutral condition. In addition, the cued recall test
displayed no significant differences between con-
ditions with regard to the central detail,
c2(2)=3.91, p=.14. As for the peripheral bicycle,
neither free recall, c2(2)=0.29, p=.86, nor cued
recall c2(2)=0.59, p=.74, revealed differences
between conditions.
Figure 1. Mean time per fixation on the central and periph-
eral detail in the emotional, unusual, andneutral conditions in
Experiment 1.
TABLE 1
Recall of central andperipheral informationof the critical slide inExperiment 1
Emotional
Condition
(n= 22)
Unusual
Condition
(n=21)
Neutral
Condition
(n= 20)
Free Recalla
Central 72.7 95.2 60.0
Peripheral 45.5 38.1 45.0
Cued Recalla
Central 72.7 95.2 80.0
Peripheral 68.2 57.1 65.0
Detailed Cued Recallb
Central 0.28 (0.11) 0.25 (0.10) 0.26 (0.11)
Peripheral 0.22 (0.18) 0.21 (0.16) 0.20 (0.16)
Colour Shirta 22.7 4.8 20
ColourBicyclea 45.5 38.1 55
a Percentage of subjects who answered correctly.
b Meanproportion characteristics. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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For detailed cued recall, a 3 (conditions)´2
(central vs peripheral detail) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor was
performed on the proportion data. There was a
significant main effect of detail, F(1,60)=5.70,
p<.05, whereas the main effect of condition was
not significant, F(2,60)=0.33, p=.72. The critical
interaction effect indicating differential recall of
central and peripheral characteristics across con-
ditions, failed toreach significance, F(2,60)=0.07,
p=.93. As for the spontaneously mentioned col-
our informationduringdetailedcued recall, there
were no differences between the conditions. This
absence of reliable differences was true for the
central girl’s shirt,c2(2)=2.97, p=0.23; as well as
for the peripheral bicycle, c2(2)=1.18, p=0.55.
The attentional narrowing hypothesis predicts
that a high level of physiological arousal leads to
attentional narrowing, which, in turn, has ramifi-
cations for detail memory. Thus, associations
between ÖSCRs, fixation times and recall data
were examined. More specifically, Pearson pro-
duct–moment correlations for associations invol-
ving ÖSCRs, fixation times, and detailed cued
recall were computed, whereas biserial correla-
tions were calculated for associations involving
freeandcuedrecall.ÖSCRsandfixationtimes for
the central girl were found to be correlated,
r(50)=.26, p<.05, one-tailed. However, no asso-
ciation between ÖSCRs and peripheral fixation
times was found, r(50)=–.09. Peripheral fixation
times were positively correlated with cued recall
anddetailedcued recall of the peripheral bicycle,
r(51)=.33, p<.01 and r(51)=.25, p<.05, respec-
tively. Yet, neither ÖSCRs nor fixation times
correlated with any of the recall tests for central
information. Likewise, no associations emerged
between ÖSCRs and recall of peripheral infor-
mation.
Table1suggests that about 30%of thesubjects
in the emotional condition failed to recall the
central girl, even when provided with cues.
Possibly, this high percentage has to do with the
strict criterion on which we relied. To elucidate
this issue, non-responses (i.e. failing to mention
the central girl) were considered inmore detail.
Table 2 shows that during free recall, a large
majority of the non-responders in the emotional
conditiondidmentionthat theyhadseenachildin
thecritical slide. Only in theneutral conditiondid
a substantialminorityof thesubjects (20%) fail to
mention the central girl. During cued recall, all
subjects at least said that they had seen a child in
thetarget slide.Wealsocalculatedthepercentage
of subjects that spontaneously mentioned the sex
of the child when asked to give a specific
description during the detailed cued recall test.
Only twosubjects in the emotional condition said
they had seen a child; all other subjects specified
the sex of the child.
Another point that canbe inferred fromTable
1 is that the proportion of subjects who sponta-
neouslymentionedcolour is relatively low. This is
especially true for the colour of the central girl’s
shirt. Acloser look at thenon-responses revealed
that a considerable percentage of the subjects
specified the wrong colour (40.9%; 38.1% and
45% in the emotional, unusual, and neutral con-
ditions, respectively). For the peripheral bicycle,
this type of error was relatively rare in the
emotional (4.5%) and neutral (10%) conditions.
However, in the unusual condition, 33%
mentioned thewrong colour for the bicycle.
TABLE 2
Type of responses given inExperiment 1
Response
Recall Test Condition No Response Girl Child
FreeRecall Emotional 4.5 72.7 22.7
Unusual – 95.2 4.8
Neutral 20 60 20
CuedRecall Emotional – 72.7 27.3
Unusual – 95.2 4.8
Neutral – 80 20
DetailedCuedRecall Emotional – 90.9 9.1
Unusual – 100 –
Neutral – 100 –
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Discussion
In line with predictions flowing from the atten-
tional narrowing hypothesis of emotional mem-
ory, subjects in the emotional conditiondisplayed
substantially higher arousal responses (SCRs),
looked for longer durations at the central girl,
and spent less time looking at the peripheral
bicycle than subjects in the neutral condition.
Nevertheless, the predicted differential recall
patterns did not occur. That is, compared to the
control conditions, subjects in the emotional
groupdid not showenhancedmemory for central
information, nor did they display impairedmem-
ory for peripheral information. In addition, only
for peripheral information were modest associa-
tions found between fixation times and recall,
while such correlations failed to occur for tests
involving central detail recall. Clearly, then, dif-
ferential allocation of attention at the time of sti-
mulus processing does not imply a differential
recall pattern of central and peripheral details.
Thus, the current findings underline the conclu-
sion drawn earlier by Christianson (Christianson,
1992; Christianson et al., 1991) that the link
between attentional narrowing and emotional
memory is imperfect. Note that this imperfect
link cannot be attributed to the encoding stage.
From Table 2, it can be concluded that initial
failures to mention the central character during
free recall cannot be accounted for in terms of a
failure to encode the central item. During
detailed cued recall, all subjects mentioned hav-
ing seen a girl or child.
As for the role of unusualness, the eye-move-
ment patterns in the unusual condition did not
differ from those in the emotional condition.
Moreover, compared totheneutral condition, the
unusual group was more likely to mention the
central girl at free recall. Thus, onthesemeasures,
the unusual group came closer to the emotional
group than to the neutral group.
All in all, the present findings are difficult to
reconcilewithearlier studies claiming that central
details of an emotional stimulus are relatively
well retained, while peripheral details of such a
stimulus are relatively poorly retained (e.g.
Christianson & E.F. Loftus, 1991). These
conflicting findings may reflect procedural
differences. For example, the present approach
differs in several respects from the design
employed by Christianson and E.F. Loftus
(1991). To begin with, Christianson and E.F.
Loftus tested recall of one particular character-
istics of their central and peripheral items (i.e.
colours), whereas we mainly looked at the
response categories of ‘‘girl’’ and ‘‘bicycle’’.
Note, however, that in the present study, inspec-
tion of spontaneously mentioned colour informa-
tionduringdetailed recall revealednodifferences
between emotional, unusual, and neutral condi-
tions. Still, spontaneous descriptions may not be
comparable to answering specific questions about
colour information. Apart from a high rate of
erroneous colour recall, our data also showed a
high rate of subjectswho failed tomentioncolour
at all. It remains possible that the latter category
of subjects would answer correctly when specifi-
cally asked about colours.
A second issue is that we used substantially
longer presentation and interstimulus times than
ChristiansonandE.F.Loftusdid. It is conceivable
that differences in detail memory are more
pronounced when subjects have less time for
encoding. A third procedural difference is that
Christianson and E.F. Loftus merely instructed
their subjects to attend closely to the stimuli,
whereas subjects in the present experiment
received extensive identification instructions.
Afinal issuehas todowiththepotential lackof
power of our study. Although the current study
relied on a sample size (n=63) that was compar-
able to that of the Christianson and E.F. Loftus
(1991, experiment 1) study (i.e. n=60), these
authors foundmediumeffect sizes for differential
recall of central and peripheral information (i.e.
w=.34 for the central woman; w=.30 for the
peripheral car).With sucheffects, our sample size
allowed for a statistical power of .55.
Asecondexperimentwasconductedinorderto
explore whether differential recall patterns could
bereplicatedwhenthe instructions, short stimulus
exposure, and interval times of Christianson and
E.F. Loftus (1991) are employed. Also, sample
size was increased so as to ensure a power of at
least .70.
EXPERIMENT 2
Thepurposeof Experiment 2was to replicate the
Christianson and E.F. Loftus (1991) study, using
the stimulus material of Experiment 1. Specifi-
cally, subjectsweremerely instructed toattend to
the slides, which were presented for relatively
short durations. In addition, onlymemory for the
colours associatedwith the central andperipheral
detail informationwas tested.
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Method
Subjects. Subjects were 86 undergraduate
volunteers. Their mean agewas 20.6 years (range
18–36 years). They were assigned to one of three
conditions (Emotional Condition, n=32;Unusual
Condition, n=24; Neutral Condition, n=30.
Stimulus material and apparatus. The
stimulus material consisted of the thematic slide
series described in Experiment 1. A Kodak
carouselprojectedslidesontoascreeninfrontofa
classroom.
Procedure. Subjects were tested in a class-
room after an introductory psychology course
about an unrelated topic. They were asked to
participate in a short experiment. Next, the class
was divided into three groups. One group was
tested at a time, while the subjects in the other
groups left for acoffeebreak. First, theemotional
condition was run, then the neutral version, and
finally the unusual condition.
Subjects were told that theywould see a series
of slides andafterwards wouldperformadrawing
task. Before the slide series was projected, sub-
jects were informed that the slides depicted
situations one could encounter on the way to
university to take an exam. UnlikeExperiment 1,
nofurther instructionsweregiven.Next, theslides
were presented. Each slide was presented for
threesecondsandinterstimulusintervalswereone
second (see Christianson & E.F. Loftus, 1991,
Experiment 2). Immediately after slide presenta-
tion, subjects performed a filler task. This task
consisted of copying geometric figures that were
presentedonthescreenbyanoverheadprojector.
Subjects were given30 seconds for each figure. In
total, they copied eight figures. Next, a surprise
cued recall task was administered. For this pur-
pose, a version of the critical eighth slide was
presented, from which the central girl and the
peripheral bicycle were removed (see Detailed
Cued Recall task, Experiment 1). Subjects were
asked towrite down the colour of the blouse that
the person missing from the slide was wearing.
Next, they wrote down the colour of the missing
bicycle. They were allowed 40 seconds for each
question. Subjects were asked not to discuss the
experiment with other students. Toprevent them
fromtalking, theyleft throughtheemergencyexit,
while the next group waited in front of the
oppositemain entrance.
Results and discussion
Table 3 summarises the percentages of subjects
whoaccurately reported the colour of the central
girl’s blouse (white) and the colour of the per-
ipheralbicycle(pink/red).Conditionssignificantly
differed with regard to memory for the central
detail, c2(2)=8.45, p<.05. Separate c2 analyses
indicated that subjects in the emotional condition
more often reported the accurate colour of the
blouse than subjects in either the unusual condi-
tion,c2(1)=5.73, p<.05, or the neutral condition,
c2(1)=6.46, p<.05. As for the colour of the per-
ipheral bicycle, results were in the expected
direction, but failed to reach significance,
c2(2)=0.58, p=.75.
Insum, resultsoncentral detail informationare
in line with those reported by Christianson and
E.F. Loftus (1991). As for peripheral detail
information, there were slight but nonsignificant
differences in the expecteddirection. In addition,
inspection of Table 3 reveals that the emotional
groupmore frequently reported the central detail
than the peripheral detail. The unusual and
neutral groups showed a reverse recall pattern.
Taken together, Experiment 2 partially replicates
thedifferential recall patternobservedinprevious
work on emotional detail memory (e.g. Burke et
al., 1992; Christianson&E.F. Loftus, 1991).
EXPERIMENT 3
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that when
subjects are tested under similar conditions as in
the Christianson and E.F. Loftus (1991) study,
recall of a central detail of an emotional stimulus
is enhanced as opposed to that of an unusual or
neutral stimulus. However, Experiment 1 did not
findevidence for suchdifferential recall, although
that experiment found clear indications for
attentional narrowing (i.e. larger SCRs to the
emotional slideandlonger fixationsonthecentral
TABLE 3
Recall of colour information inExperiment 2
Colour Recall
Emotional
Condition
(n= 32)
Unusual
Condition
(n=24)
Neutral
Condition
(n= 30)
Central 65.6 33.3 33.3
Peripheral 34.4 41.7 43.3
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part of the slide). Although Experiment 1 relied
on the same stimulus material as Experiment 2,
the experimental circumstances (i.e. instructions,
stimulus durations, and interstimulus intervals)
werequitedifferent.Aplausible interpretationof
the conflicting results of Experiments 1 and 2 is
one in terms of stimulus exposure time and
interstimulus intervals. Keeping the attentional
narrowing hypothesis in mind, it is conceivable
that longer durations undermine systematic
effects of attentional direction on recall. That is,
effects of differential attentional focus on emo-
tional and neutral material occurring in the first
few moments of stimulus presentation might be
overruledwhenlongerpresentationtimesprovide
subjects in one group with the opportunity to
catch up with the other group. Inspired by the
findings of Experiment 1 that many subjects
recalled erroneous colour information, another
explanation would be that longer stimulus dura-
tions and interstimulus intervals give rise tomore
extensive elaboration. This might interfere with
memory for perceptual details such as colour.
These considerations suggest that a differential
recall pattern that favours central detail informa-
tion occurs with shorter rather than with longer
presentation times. This speculationwas tested in
a third experiment. As increasing ecological
validity through self-relevant instructions was an
important aim of Experiment 1, similar instruc-
tions were employed. At the same time, stimulus
durations and interstimulus intervals were sys-
tematically varied. Because the main purpose of
Experiment 3 was to examine whether stimulus
durations are responsible for the absence of dif-
ferential recall patterns in Experiment 1, we did
not obtain physiological measures.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 180 undergraduates.
Their mean age was 18.8 years (range 17–27
years). Subjectswere randomlyassigned tooneof
six conditions (see later; n=30 ineachcondition).
They were tested either individually or in small
groups with amaximumof three subjects in each
group. Subjects were paid for their participation.
Stimulus material and apparatus. Stimulus
materialwas identical tothat usedinExperiments
1 and2. AKodakcarousel projected slides ontoa
white wall, approximately two metres in front of
the subjects. The size of the projected image was
125´85cm. Stimulus durations and interstimulus
intervals were regulated by a Compaq deskpro
486 personal computer, controlling a Compur
shutter.
Procedure. Subjects were tested in a sound-
attenuated, dimly lit room. Upon arrival in the
laboratory, subjects were told that the purposeof
the experiment was measuring physiological
reactions (heart rate)whileviewingslides.Then, a
plethysmograph was attached to one of the sub-
ject’s index fingers. This transducer was not con-
nected to any measurement device, but was
intended to provide a credible cover story. The
cover story was introduced to prevent subjects
fromexpecting some kind of memory test. Next,
identification instructions were given in the same
fashion as in the preliminary study and Experi-
ment 1.
Immediately following instructions, the slide
series was presented. Subjects saw either the
emotional, unusual, or neutral versionof the slide
series. Eachversionwaspresentedundereitherof
two conditions. In the long presentation/ISI con-
dition, slides were shown for 4 seconds and inter-
stimulus intervals were 6.6 seconds (see
Experiment 1). In the short presentation/ISI con-
dition, slide duration was 3 seconds and inter-
stimulus intervals were set at 1 second (see
Experiment 2). Thus, therewere six conditions in
a 3 (versions)´2 (presentation times) between-
subjects design.
After slide presentation, subjects completed
some filler questionnaires in another room. The
filler task took 10 minutes. Following this, the
three recall tasks described in Experiment 1 (i.e.
Free Recall, Cued Recall, and Detailed Cued
Recall) were administered. Next, subjects
answered two open-ended questions about the
colours of the central girl’s blouse and the
peripheral bicycle (Additional Questions).
Finally, subjects were debriefed and paid. The
total procedure took about 45minutes.
Results
Free recall, cued recall, and additional ques-
tions. Scoring of the memory data followed a
similarprocedureas thatemployedinExperiment
1. In order to explore the effect of presentation
times and interstimulus interval durations on
recall, logistic regressionanalyseswereperformed
onmemory tasks involvingdichotomous variables
CENTRALANDPERIPHERALDETAILMEMORY 103
(i.e. Free Recall, Cued Recall, and Additional
Questions). Performance on the various recall
tasks concerning either the central girl or the
peripheral bicycle were dependent variables,
whereasversion(emotionalvsunusualvsneutral),
presentation/ISI duration (short vs long), and the
version by presentation/ISI duration interaction
served as predictors. Table 4 shows the results of
the various recall tasks.
Central girl. For Free Recall, the logistic
regression analysis rendered a borderline sig-
nificant interaction termof presentation/ISI time
and the contrast between the emotional and
unusual version, B=1.55, se=0.82, p=0.06. Thus,
the unusual version tended to produce more
reports of the central girl than the emotional
version during short, but not during long pre-
sentation/ISI times.
Logistic regression analysis of Cued Recall
results did not show any significant interactions
between presentation/ISI times and version.
However, the presentation/ISI time main effect
was marginally significant, B=–0.98, se=0.54,
p=.07, indicating that longpresentation/ISI times
tended to elicit more frequent reports of the
central girl than short presentation/ISI times.
Furthermore, significant effects occurred for the
contrasts between the emotional and unusual
versions, B=–1.52, se=0.59, p<.01, and the
emotional and neutral versions, B=–1.32,
se=0.57, p<.05. Thus, overall, the emotional
version was associated with poorer performance
than the other versions.
As for the colour of the central girl’s blouse
(Additional Questions), no significant interaction
between presentation/ISI times and version
occurred.Thecontrastbetweentheemotional and
unusual versions reached borderline significance,
B=1.06, se=0.62, p=.09. Thus, the emotional
version tended to elicit more frequent reports of
theaccuratecolourof theblouse thantheunusual
version.
Peripheral bicycle. Logistic regression of the
Free Recall results rendered no significant main
effects or interactions.
Althoughtherewerenosignificant interactions
for Cued Recall, the contrast between the emo-
tional and unusual version reached borderline
significance, B=–1.2, se=0.62, p=.05. Thus,
overall, subjects who saw the unusual version
tended to outperformsubjects who saw the emo-
tional version in reporting the peripheral bicycle.
No significant main or interaction effects were
found for reporting the colour of the bicycle
(Additional Questions).
TABLE 4
Recall in Experiment 3 as a functionof presentation/ISI duration
Short Presentation/ISI Duration Long Presentation/ISI Duration
Emotional
Version
Unusual
Version
Neutral
Version
Emotional
Version
Unusual
Version
Neutral
Version
Free Recalla
Centralb 50 (36.7) 80 (3.3) 56.7 (16.7) 73.3 (23.3) 70 (16.7) 73.3 (20)
Peripheral 10 20 6.7 16.7 36.7 13.3
Cued Recalla
Centralb 46.7 (46.7) 80 (20) 76.7 (16.7) 70 (26.7) 80 (13.3) 86.7 (10)
Peripheral 16.7 40 13.3 30 53.3 13.3
Detailed Cued Recallc
Central 0.23 (0.14) 0.24 (0.09) 0.24 (0.13) 0.23 (0.12) 0.27 (0.12) 0.23 (0.11)
Peripheral 0.07 (0.13) 0.11 (0.11) 0.05 (0.13) 0.07 (0.11) 0.14 (0.14) 0.05 (0.13)
Colour Recalla
Central 36.7 16.7 26.7 26.7 13.3 20
Peripheral 13.3 26.7 13.3 13.3 46.7 10
N=30 in every condition.
a Percentage of subjects.
b Percentages of subjects who gave a general (child, person) or erroneous (boy) response are in parentheses.
c Proportion correct characteristics. Standarddeviations are in parentheses.
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Detailed cued recall. For the Detailed Cued
Recall test, data were first transformed into pro-
portions(seeExperiment1).Next, a2(conditions:
long vs. short presentation/ISI)´3 (versions:
emotional, unusual, neutral)´2(detail: central vs
peripheral) ANOVAwith repeatedmeasures on
the last factor was performed. No significant
interactions were obtained. However, significant
maineffects of version,F(1,174)=5.66, p<.01and
detail, F(1,174)=173.44, p<.001, emerged. Sepa-
rate t-tests were performed to break down the
main effect of version. Subjects who saw the
unusual version reported significantly more
characteristics than subjects who saw either the
emotional version, t(118)=–2.51, p<.05, or the
neutral version, t(118)=3.24, p<.01. No differ-
ences emerged between the emotional and the
neutral versions.
As in Experiment 1, we used a rather strict
scoring criterion for the central item(i.e. ‘‘girl’’).
Table4alsoshows thepercentageof subjectswho
gave a response other than ‘‘girl’’ (i.e. either a
general or an erroneous response) on free and
cued recall for the central item. Again, it appears
that many non-responders gave a more general
(i.e. ‘‘child’’ or ‘‘person’’) or wrong response (i.e.
‘‘boy’’) rather than failing tomention the central
person.During thedetailedcuedrecall, almost all
subjects in the unusual and neutral conditions
accurately specified sex of the central child
(96.7% and 95%, respectively). Interestingly,
subjects inemotional conditionwereconsiderably
less accurate, c2(2)=11.82, p<.01, in that 20%of
themfailed tomention the girl.
Discussion
The main results of Experiment 3 can be
summarised as follows. First, no support was
found for the assumption that relatively long
stimulus and interstimulus interval durations
undermine differential recall of central and
peripheral details of emotional material. At best,
there were a few nonsignificant trends in that
direction. That is, during short presentations and
interstimulus intervals, the emotional version
tendedtoelicitpoorerfreerecall of thecentral girl
than the unusual version, but this recall pattern
was absent during long presentation and inter-
stimulus durations. In addition, the long
presentation/ISI condition tended to elicit better
cued recall of the central girl than the shorter
presentation/ISI condition.
Second, contrary to expectations, subjects who
saw the emotional version displayed poorer cued
recall of the central girl than subjects who saw
either theunusual or neutral version. It should be
noted, though, that the poor reproduction of the
central girl in the emotional condition was not
linked to an absolute failure of recall. Rather, it
reflects a tendency to give more general respon-
ses. Further, the unusual group recalled more
details (i.e. Detailed Cued Recall) than either of
the two other groups. One could argue that the
detailedcuedrecall scores for the central features
of the neutral slide should be interpreted with
cautionbecause theneutral slidehad less codable
characteristics of the central girl than the emo-
tional and unusual slides (i.e. 15 vs 18). Note
however, that the problem does not exist for
comparisons involving the emotional andunusual
conditions.
Still, the emotional groupmoreoften provided
an accurate report of the colour associated with
thecentral itemthantheunusual group.Likewise,
the data presented in Table 4 suggest that the
unusual condition displayed better peripheral
colourrecall thantheother twogroups. Thispoint
is further underscored by the results of a condi-
tional regression analysis.2 However, this differ-
ential pattern of colour recall seems weaker than
that found in Experiment 2. In the current
experiment roughlyonethirdof thesubjects inthe
emotional condition accurately recalled the
central colour, whereas in Experiment 2 almost
two-thirds of the emotional group did so. Thus,
sometrends inthepresentdataare inlinewiththe
2 To test the interaction between version (emotional, unu-
sual, neutral) and type of details (central vs peripheral),
responses to the Additional Questions were subjected to a
conditional logistic regressionanalysis (Hosmer&Lemeshow,
1989). The logic behind this analysis is as follows. Given that
theoutcomes inthecurrent experimentweredichotomous(i.e.
recall vs no recall), only those subjects who correctly recalled
one colour, but not the other, were informative toa test of the
within-subject effect under consideration (i.e. central vs per-
ipheral recall). By restrictingtheconditional logistic regression
analysis to those subjects only, the dependent variable reflec-
ted the probabilityof correct recall of thecentral colour, given
that recall was successful for either the colour of the central
girl’s blouse or the colour of the peripheral bicycle. Predictors
were slide version (emotional, unusual, neutral), presentation
duration (short vs long), and the version by presentation
duration interaction. Neither stimulus duration, nor the inter-
action between slide version and stimulus duration affected
colour recall (p=.34, and p=.67, respectively). However, the
criticalmaineffect of slideversion(reflectingaversionbytype
of detail interaction) attained significance, p<.05.
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expected differential recall patterns, but they are
not very pronounced and are limited to compar-
isons involving the unusual condition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Theattentionalnarrowinghypothesispredictsthat
under conditions of high physiological arousal,
attentionwill be focusedon the central aspects of
an event, at the cost of attention for peripheral
information.Thiswouldproducedifferentialrecall
of central andperipheral aspects of an event. The
primary aim of Experiment 1 was to test this
hypothesis in a student sample. An unusual con-
ditionwas included to control for theoutstanding
propertiesofemotionalmaterial. Furthermore,we
sought to increase ecological validity by giving
subjects extensive self-relevant instructions.
In Experiment 1, part of the attentional nar-
rowing hypothesis was supported in that com-
pared to the neutral condition, the emotional
group was more aroused and showed eye-move-
ment patterns indicativeof attentional narrowing.
Nevertheless, the emotional group failed to
display the expected differential recall patterns.
To further explore the experimental parameters
that might be responsible for these results, two
additional experiments were conducted.
Experiment 2 followedthedesignemployedby
Christianson and E.F. Loftus (1991) as closely as
possible. With this set-up, enhanced recall of the
central detail was found in the emotional group.
Thus, the findings of Experiment 2 demonstrate
that the lackof differential recall inExperiment 1
cannot be interpreted as an artefact of our newly
developed stimulus material. To explore whether
long stimulus exposure and interstimulus interval
durationsmight overshadoweffectsof differential
attentionallocation,durationsweresystematically
varied in Experiment 3. Results of Experiment 3
strongly suggest that such variations have little or
no impact on recall patterns. In line with the
results of Experiment 1, the emotional group did
not display enhanced memory for central or
impaired memory for peripheral information.
However, when they were specifically asked to
provide colour information, the emotional group
tended to display the expected recall pattern in
comparison to the unusual group. However, this
patternwas lesspronouncedthanthat obtainedin
Experiment 2.
Taken together, the experimental circum-
stances created inExperiment 2weremost likely
toyield recall patterns consistent with results that
have repeatedly been found in previous studies
(see Christianson, 1992), namely more accurate
recall of central detail information in the emo-
tional groupcompared to theunusual andneutral
control groups. Yet in Experiments 1 and 3, the
unusual condition sometimes outperformed the
emotional group, especiallyonfree recall. Thus, it
appears that under slightly different experimental
circumstances theoutstanding, but not emotional,
propertiesof astimulushaveabeneficial effect on
central detail recall accuracy. However, the fact
that this superiority of the unusual groupwas not
consistent across the various recall measures
precludes strong conclusions.
It shouldbenoted that a recall failure carries a
different meaning for the peripheral bicycle and
the central girl. The peripheral bicycle was either
mentionedoritwasnot. Inaddition,Experiment1
demonstrated that peripheral recall was
significantlycorrelatedwitheyefixationdurations.
Thus, afailuretoreport theperipheralbicyclemay
be indicative of an initial encoding failure due to
attentionalnarrowing.Closerinspectionoffailures
toreport thecentral girl paints adifferent picture.
While many subjects did not mention the girl
explicitly, they indicated that they had seen
someone in the critical slide. Thus, it is less likely
that the central character was not encoded at all.
How should the complex pattern of results
produced by the current experiments be inter-
preted?Afirst explanation is in terms of the type
of instructiongiven tothesubjects incombination
with the type of recall task afterwards. In
Experiment 2, subjects weremerely instructed to
attend closely to the slides, whereas Experiments
1 and 3 employed self-relevant identification
instructions. Perhaps, then, these different
instructions had ramifications for the encoding
strategy employedby the subjects.
In processing accounts of memory (e.g. Craik,
Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson 1996;
Roediger,Weldon,&Challis, 1989), it is generally
assumedthat theextent towhichpeopleelaborate
material during encoding influences the way in
which they subsequently recall that material.
Accordingly, it is conceivable that the extensive
identification instructions of Experiments 1 and 3
ledour subjects toengage ina top-down, schema-
based encoding strategy. This might have been
less the case for the subjects receiving ‘‘mere
viewing’’ instructions in Experiment 2. Apart
from encoding, it has been argued that recall
performance depends on the type of subsequent
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testing (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger et al., 1989).
Perhaps subjects who received ‘‘mere viewing’’
instructions predominantly inspected the physical
propertiesof thepresentedstimulusmaterial. The
subsequent cued recall task, in which part of the
visual information was reinstated, may have
provided an appropriate constellation for
retrieving colour information. Following this line
of reasoning, onecouldarguethatenhancedrecall
of central colour information in the emotional
group of Experiment 2 may be due to the
modulating effects of arousal-related brain
processes (e.g. Cahill & McGaugh, 1996; Cahill,
Prins,Weber, &McGaugh, 1994). Incontrast, the
identification instructions in Experiments 1 and 3
may have induced ruminations about how to
integrate the target slide intothe story rather than
the encoding of perceptual features. The recall
tasks, however, predominantly asked for specific
perceptual information. Possibly, this mismatch
precluded, or in case of the colour questions in
Experiment 3, attenuated, differential recall pat-
terns. In sum, then, the contrasting findings of
Experiment2ontheonehand, andExperiments1
and 3 on the other hand, may be understood in
terms of encoding emphasis induced by the
experimental instructions. Of course, this inter-
pretation is post-hoc and should be empirically
evaluated.
A second explanation for our pattern of find-
ings has to do with an important procedural dif-
ference between the experiments. In Experiment
2, subjectsweremerely askedtorecall thecolours
associatedwiththecentral andperipheral itemsof
the target slide. In contrast, subjects in Experi-
ments 1 and 3 performed a series of recall tasks,
varying in level of specificity of the responses
required. It may well be the case that while per-
tinent information is available in memory, the
nature of the recall task is crucial for inviting its
expression. In other words, even though subjects
may know that they sawa young girl, this knowl-
edge may not be as relevant for describing the
target slide during free recall as the fact that she
lay injuredon the crossing. Ona relatednote, the
detailed cued recall test asked for specific,
perceptual details associatedwith the central and
peripheral items in the target slide. But as far as
the central itemis concerned, such information is
not relevant to the theme of the slide story and
therefore has a peripheral status in that respect.
Thus, theideathat someinformationinmemoryis
not expressed until it is specifically targetedmay
provide an explanation for our inconsistent
results. Consider Experiment 3. For the detailed
cued recall task, relatively general instructions
were given to the subjects and differential recall
patterns (i.e. an interaction of slide version and
type of detail) were absent. In contrast, for the
specific colour questions in that experiment, a
tendency in the expected direction (i.e. differ-
ential recall in subjects who saw the emotional
slide) did occur. On the other hand, post-hoc
inspection of the number of subjects that sponta-
neously mentioned colour during detailed cued
recall reveals that theemotionalgroupdisplayeda
slight advantage relative to the unusual group in
mentioning thecentral colour.3 This indicates that
an explanation in terms of recall task specificity
cannot fully account for the current findings.
There were other procedural differences
between the experiments that deserve some
comment. Tobeginwith, subjects inExperiments
1 and 3were instructed that the goal of the study
wasmeasuringphysiological reactions toslides. In
contrast, subjects inExperiment 2heardnocover
story. Thus, expectationsof arecall taskmayhave
influencedtheresults.Ontheotherhand, it seems
unlikely that subjects would specifically have
expected a recall task involving colours. Even if
theydid, it isdifficult toseewhysuchexpectations
wouldpromotedifferential recall in theemotional
group.Amore serious point is that the subjects in
Experiments 1 and 3 performed various recall
tasks, some of which involved all the slides that
were seen. This may have interfered with their
recall of perceptual information. For example, it
may be argued that the mere act of retrieving
perceptual information of the preceding seven
slides hampered the accurate recall of colour
information of the critical eighth slide.
Taken together, the absence of differential
3 The percentages of subjects who spontaneously men-
tioned colour information duringDCRwere as follows. In the
short stimulus durationcondition, the colour of theblousewas
mentioned by 23.3%, 3.3%, and 20%of the emotional, unu-
sual, and neutral groups, respectively. For the long stimulus
duration condition, these percentages were 26.7 for the emo-
tional, 6.7 for the unusual, and 16.7 for the neutral group.
Separate logistic regression analysis showed that the contrast
between the emotional and unusual groups reached sig-
nificance, B=–2.18, se=1.1, p<.05. In the short stimulus
duration condition, 13.3% of the emotional, 16.7% of the
unusual, and 10%of the neutral group in the short stimulus
duration condition mentioned the colour of the peripheral
bicycle. For the long stimulus duration condition, these per-
centageswere13.3, 36.7, and10for theemotional, unusual, and
neutral groups, respectively. A separate logistic regression
analysis did not yeild significantmain or interaction effects.
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recall patterns in Experiments 1 and 3 may be
explained by instructional variables and/or pro-
cedural issues such as the number and type of
recall tests employed. Future studies may estab-
lish if, and to what extent, both parameters con-
tributeto(theabsenceof)differential recall inthis
type of experimental approach. However, the
questionarisesofwhat theexact relevanceof such
an enterprise would be. The main purpose of
Experiment 1 was exploring the underlying
mechanism (i.e. attentional narrowing; Chris-
tianson, 1992) of a frequently observed phenom-
enon (i.e. enhanced central detail and impaired
peripheral detail recall of emotional material) in
eyewitness literature. This phenomenon was
observed in different experiments, conducted in
different laboratories with different stimulus
materials (e.g. Burke et al., 1992; Christianson&
E.F.Loftus, 1991).Asubsidiaryaimof thepresent
studies was to increase the ecological validity of
the experimental approach to this phenomenon.
YuilleandTollestrup(1992) identifiedtwoclosely
related variables that critically differ between
laboratory and real-life emotional situations,
namelyinvolvementof thesubjectsandemotional
intensity.Manipulating the first variableby giving
self-involvement instructions, however, resulted
in radically different recall patterns than were
anticipated. Thus, what seemed to be a robust
phenomenon, turned out to be a result that criti-
cally depends on rather specific experimental cir-
cumstances. This raisesquestionsabout theextent
to which emotional memory can be studied with
experiments relying on normal subjects viewing
relatively unobtrusive slides. To be sure, the
experimental approach is essential for studying
possible underlying mechanisms of the observed
phenomena. Therefore, we suggest that rather
thanputting effort and resources intopinpointing
the exact experimental parameters that produce
the desired phenomenon in normal subjects, it
may be more worthwhile to invest in other
methods that seek to increase emotional intensity
in an ethically acceptablemanner. Research from
our laboratory (Wessel & Merckelbach, 1997,
1998) indicates that confrontingphobicswiththeir
feared object, thereby indicating relatively high
levels of emotion, might provide such an alter-
native method. This may offer a more promising
approach for testing the attentional narrowing
hypothesis of emotional memory.
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APPENDIX
Tape-recorded instruction giving the background of the story
depicted in the slide series:
You are a student in Health Sciences. You are living with
several people in a student dorm. You like it there: you are
always having a good time. In fact, you are having such a
good time, that you spendtoo little time studying. Recently,
you failedanexamfor that reason. Only a fewpeople failed
the exam. Therefore, the professor did not think it was
necessarytogiveanotherwrittentest, but decidedtogivean
oral exam. This time, you are well prepared and you feel
confident that you will pass. Today is the day of the exam.
Your appointment is at 10.30am. It is nowmorningandyou
justwokeup.Yousleptwell andyoufeel rested. This iswhat
you see:
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